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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation on behalf of the state of
Utah,
C^se No. 20100203

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KEITH STREET,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is appealed from a conviction and sentence f()r Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor, under Utah Cod^ Ann. § 41-6a-502.
Conviction and sentence were entered pursuant to a conditional guilty plea in accordance
with State v. Sery. 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Jurisdiction lies under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e), wherein the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction over appeals from a court of record in criminal tases (except for matters
involving a first degree felony or capitol felony).
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUHORY PROVISIONS
The controlling constitutional and statutory provisions arje those which have been
attached to Appellant's Brief as Addenda "A" through "D". Th^se include: the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution (Brief of Appellant, Addendum "A"),
l

Article I, § 14 of the Utah State Constitution (Brief of Appellant, Addendum "B"), and
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Brief of Appellant, Addendum "C"). Also attached to
Appellant's Brief is the trial court's memorandum decision (Brief of Appellant,
Addendum UD").
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evening of July 17, 2008, Salt Lake City Police Officer Todd Hyatt was on
duty, working a foot patrol assignment in Liberty Park. Motion Hearing Transcript, 3
(hereafter "MHT"). Liberty Park is located at approximately 601 East and 1300 South,
within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. MHT, 3. Officer Hyatt was working at the
Animal Planet exhibit in the park, and was assigned to protect the displays and
equipment. MHT, 3. Officer Hyatt was in uniform at the time, and was on duty with one
other officer. MHT, 3-4.
At approximately 9:07 p.m., a passerby in the park approached Officer Hyatt while
he was walking on the sidewalk. MHT, 4. This passerby was a woman who had her
children with her. MHT, 4. According to Officer Hyatt, the woman appeared "concerned
about a person that was in a vehicle that had a child in the car with him and was passed
out." MHT, 4. The woman also indicated that she believed the person was intoxicated.
MHT, 4. The woman's demeanor was one of concern for the welfare of the child in the
vehicle, as she did not want someone who she believed to be intoxicated to drive with a
child in the car. MHT, 12. The woman wanted to bring this information to Officer
Hyatt's attention and asked him "to go check out the car that she was concerned about.'!
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MHT, 13. The woman then described what the person's vehicle looked like and told
Officer Hyatt exactly where the vehicle was located. MHT, 4. t h e woman pointed to the
east side of the park and told Officer Hyatt what the car looked jike. MHT, 4. The
woman also described for Officer Hyatt what the person lookedlike. MHT, 5.
Officer Hyatt next went looking for the described individual and vehicle. MHT, 5.
Officer Hyatt went to locate the individual without asking the ^oman for any identifying
information such as her name, home address, and telephone number. MHT, 10. The
woman did not volunteer this information when she approached Officer Hyatt, and he
went to make contact with the identified individual without obtaining additional details.
MHT, 10-12. By Officer Hyatt's estimation, the vehicle was approximately 300 to 500
yards away from his location when he was first approached by t|ie woman and her
children. MHT, 5. Officer Hyatt went to the location identify by the woman, and was
successful in locating the described vehicle. MHT, 5. The vehicle was located south of
the entrance on the park's east loop, near a playground area. MJiT, 7. Officer Hyatt
observed two individuals inside the vehicle. MHT, 5. He saw ^i person in the driver's
seat as well as a child passenger. MHT, 5. The driver and the (Jhild matched the
descriptions provided to Officer Hyatt. MHT, 5.
By the time Officer Hyatt reached the vehicle, it was in potion. l MHT, 9. Officer

Officer Hyatt initially testified that he could not recall whethdr the vehicle was parked
in a parking stall or if it was in motion. MHT, 5, 7. He later testified that it was "fair" to
say he told another officer that he may have flagged the vehicle I down as it was in motion.
MHT, 9.
3

Hyatt did not observe the vehicle drive in an erratic manner, and stopped/contacted the
vehicle because of the information provided by the woman in the park. MHT, 10.
Officer Hyatt then spoke with the defendant, who was in the driver seat. MHT 5. The
defendant's window was already rolled down when Officer Hyatt engaged the defendant
in conversation. MHT, 6. As Officer Hyatt spoke with the defendant, Officer Hyatt
smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant, noticed the defendant's eyes were
bloodshot, and believed that the defendant "was acting as if he was intoxicated." MHT,
6-7. Because of these observations, Officer Hyatt called for on-duty officers to come
perform a DUI investigation of the defendant. MHT, 7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has not adopted the three factor test articulated by the
Court of Appeals in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy. 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 943 P.2d 231
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). To the contrary, the
Supreme Court recently intimated that a totality of the circumstances approach is
appropriate for evaluating tips in reasonable suspicion cases. The totality of the
circumstances approach is more flexible and allows for other relevant considerations in a
court's determination of whether an informant's tip can appropriately serve as the basis
for a law enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect's vehicle. But even
if this Court retains the Mulcahy framework, Officer Hyatt had reasonable suspicion to
stop the defendant's vehicle. The informant here was an unidentified citizen-witness who
approached Officer Hyatt out of concern for a child that was in a vehicle with an adult
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(the defendant) the informant believed was intoxicated and, at tljie moment, passed out.
Under the totality of the circumstances and under Mulcahy, therfe was reasonable
suspicion for the stop. Alternatively, the stop was justified under the community
caretaker doctrine articulated in Provo City v. Warden. 202 Utat Adv. Rep. 25, 844 P.2d
360 (Utah CtApp. 1992).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS NOT ApOPTED THE THREE
FACTOR TEST ADVANCED BY THE COUI^T OF APPEALS IN
KAYSVILLE CITY V. MULCAHY; ACCORDINGLY THIS COURT
SHOULD ABANDON THE MULCAHY FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYZING INFORMANTS5 TIPS IN FAV0R OF A TOTALITY
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS.

A. The test articulated by this Court in Kaysville City v. Mujcahy consists of a three
factor analysis to determine whether an informant's tip cftn properly form the basis
of an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a ^uspect.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that there are "three [different] levels of
police encounters with the public." State v. Deitman, 58 Utah J>{dv. Rep. 24, f 3, 739
P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987)(citing United States v. Merritt, 736 If .2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.
1984)); see also, United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407, (10th Cir. 1990)(stating
that there are "three categories of citizen encounters with law enforcement officials").
The three levels are as follows:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a
person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer jtias probable cause
to believe an offense has been committed or is being conimitted."
5

Dietman, 739 P.2d at 617-18 (quoting Merritt, 736 F.2d at 230).
A level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537
(10th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir. 1984),
cert denied 461 U.S. 1255(1984)); see also, Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407 (noting a level
two encounter is an investigative detention or "Terry stop"). Although a level two
encounter constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause is not
required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and
rational inferences .. . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a
crime," an officer may initiate an investigative detention without consent. Werking, 915
F.2d at 1407. After commencing an investigative detention, officers must "'diligently
[pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant.'" State v. Lopez, 237
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, | 13-14, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Grovier,
155 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, | 8, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct App. 1991). Finally, in
determining the reasonableness of an officer's stop, there is no bright-line test. State v.
Baird, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, \ 5, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). When an
officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that he or she has observed a public offense,
the officer may stop that person to conduct further investigation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-715 (2010). Reasonable suspicion is determined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216.
6

Although a traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
a reasonable traffic stop is constitutional. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. In determining
whether a traffic stop is reasonable, the Utah Supreme Court has held that courts must
answer two questions: "(1) t w l a s the police officer's action justified at its inception?" and
"(2) [w]as the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place?" Id. at 1131-32. Typically, a traffic stop is
justified at its inception when "the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in [an]
officers' presence." Id. at 1132 (quoting State v. Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, \ 7, 792
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). "In the words of the United States Supreme Court,
as long as an officer suspects that the 'driver is violating any onk of the multitude of
applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer may legally stop the
vehicle. Id (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d
660 (1979)).
Even so, a traffic violation committed in an officer's presence is not a necessary
prerequisite to a finding of the reasonableness of an individualized traffic stop. State v.
Case, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, ^ 7-8, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
There are occasions where "an officer may rely on other information" such as bulletins or
"flyers received from other law enforcement sources" to perform an investigative stop.
Id. at 1277. Such other information can also include an informant's tip. Kaysville City v.
Mulcahy, 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, | 6-7, 943 P.2d 231, 234-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert,
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). Utah courts employ a three factor test in determining
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whether an informant's tip is reliable and sufficient to serve as the basis of an officer's
reasonable suspicion to stop. Id. at 235-36. These three factors have been "gleaned from
Utah cases." Id. at 235. The three factors Utah courts consider are 1) "the type of tip or
informant involved", 2) "whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed
criminal activity to support a stop", and 3) "whether the police officer's personal
observations confirm the dispatcher's report of the informant's tip." Id. at 235-36.
i.

The type of tip or informant.

Utah courts consider the type of tip or informant because "[n]ot all tips are of
equal value in establishing reasonable suspicion." State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 216, 218
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1997). Anonymous tips are toward "the low end of the
reliability scale." Mulcahy 943 P.2d at 235 (quoting Evans, 692 So. 2d at 218). This is
because an anonymous tipster's "basis of knowledge and veracity are typically unknown."
Id. Tips from a named citizen informer, however, are considered reliable because they
"volunteer information out of concern for the community and not for personal benefit."
Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, \ 8, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990)). Veracity is assumed "when a citizen-informant provides information as a
victim or witness of crime." Id. This assumption is based in part on the fact that a named
citizen-informant potentially faces "criminal and civil prosecution if the report is false."
Id. (quoting State v. Bybee, 131 Ore. App. 492, 495, 884 P.2d 906, 908 (Or. Ct. App.
1994)).
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ii.

Detail provided regarding criminal activity|

"An informant's report of illegal activity must be sufficiently detailed to justify a
stop." Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, If 17, 177 P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App.
2008), cert, denied, 2008 Utah LEXIS 120, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008) .If it appears the
informant personally observed the details he or she relays to law enforcement, the tip's
reliability is bolstered. Mulcahy 943 P.2d at 236. Additionally, there cannot be any hint
of fabrication. Id. This Court has recognized that a tip providing sparse details about the
observed criminal activity can still form the basis of an officer's reasonable suspicion to
stop when the tip is "strongly supported by at least one of the other factors - either the
reliability of the informant or corroboration by law enforcement." Bench 2008 UT App
30 at H 19.
iii.

Police officer's observations and corroboration.

The third and final factor in weighing an informant's tip is whether the law
enforcement officer's personal observations confirm the tip. Mulcahy at 236.
Corroboration can come in one of two ways: either the officer personally observes the
described illegal conduct or finds the person and the person's vehicle in the location
"substantially as described by the informant." Id. (quoting Bybee, 884 P.2d at 908). The
degree of corroboration required varies inversely with the information's reliability.
Bench 2008 UT App 30 at 1f 21.

B. The Utah Supreme Court has employed a totality of the circumstances analysis in
this type of case, explaining that such an analysis is less exacting than a three
factor test.
The Supreme Court has noted that Mulcahy's three factor test was developed "in
the absence of any direction" from them. State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ^ 10, 104 P.3d
1265 (Utah 2004). The Court found Mulcahy's exacting analysis to be "ill-suited" to
probable cause determinations and rejected it in favor of the flexible totality of the
circumstances test articulated by United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates2, 462
U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). Id.
Several months after the instant case was argued and decided in the trial court, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. RoybaL 2010 UT 34, 232 P.3d 1016 (Utah
2010). In Roybal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' reversal of the
district court's denial of Roybal's motion to suppress evidence. Id. at^l.

Roybal

involved a 911 call from the defendant's live-in girlfriend to police dispatch requesting
assistance in a domestic dispute. Id. at *[[ 3. The 911 dispatcher sent out a bulletin based
upon the girlfriend's report requesting officer assistance. Id. at % 4. An officer
subsequently observed the defendant's van (described in the bulletin) and initiated a
traffic stop. Id. at f 5-6. The traffic stop was based upon information conveyed in the

2

The Court documented the court of appeals' use of the Mulcahy analysis in several
Fourth Amendment contexts, ranging from reasonable suspicion to detain to search
warrant analyses. Saddler 2004 UT 105 at f 9. "The rise of the three-factor test in the
court of appeals" was compared to the rise of the two-prong test in United States Supreme
Court probable cause cases that was ultimately rejected in Gates as too exacting. Id. at
n.l (citing Gates 462 U.S. at 238).
10

bulletin as well as the officer's suspicion that the defendant was jdriving while impaired
based on the manner in which the defendant operated his vehicle. Id.
The State subsequently charged the defendant with driving under the influence of
alcohol. Id. at ^f 9. The defendant moved to suppress all evidenpe obtained from the
traffic stop because the stop was made without a reasonable suspicion that the defendant
committed a crime. Id. The trial judge denied the defendant's potion. Id. In reversing,
the court of appeals analyzed the 911 call's reliability under the'three Mulcahy factors.
State v. Roybal, 2008 UT App 286, \ 11, 191 P.3d 822 (Utah Ci App. 2008), rev'd, 2010
UT 34 (Utah 2010). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, and in so doing
conducted its analysis of the 911 call/tip by "[l]ooking to the totality of the
circumstances." Roybal, 2010 UT 34 at ]f 20.
Once the reliability (and any presumption thereof) of an informant is determined, a
totality of the circumstances analysis is appropriate. Id. at 119 h To this end the Court
held that:
... an identified citizen-informant is presumed reliable,frndpersonal
involvement of the informant with the suspect neither Weakens, nor
strengthens, that presumption. Instead, after recognizing the initial
presumption, as Judge Thome stated in his dissent beloW, "Courts should
evaluate the specific and articulable facts required to subport reasonable
suspicion in their totality, rather than looking at each fa<pt in isolation."
Roybal, 191 P.3d 822, 2008 UT App 286, P 19 (Thornej J., dissenting)
(citing State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, P 23, 164 P.3d 397); see also Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. ]fd. 2d 527 (1983)
(adopting a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to Idetermining
informant reliability in place of a rigid, separate-elements test)
Id.

n

C. This Court should follow the Supreme Court's guidance and abandon the Mulcahy
framework in favor of a totality of the circumstances analysis when analyzing tip
cases.
Noteworthy in the Court's analysis of the facts in Roybal was its election to not
adopt Mulcahy''s three factor analysis in determining whether there was reasonable
suspicion for the stop. Id. at \ 20. To the contrary, the Court adopted the language of
Judge Thome's dissent in support of a totality of the circumstances approach. Id. at ^ 19.
A totality of the circumstances approach is understood as flexible in comparison to
Mulcahy''s exacting analysis. Saddler, 2004 UT 105 at \ 10. This Court should follow
the Supreme Court's guidance and abandon the Mulcahy framework in favor of a totality
of the circumstances analysis.
Further, the adoption of a totality of the circumstances analysis allows for other
considerations that lack the talismanic quality which has been ascribed to the Mulcahy
factors. For example, this court emphasized in Mulcahy that the tip reported a drunk
driver on the road.3 Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. This court then recognized that it:
must consider the ever-changing equation used to balance the rights of an
individual to be free from unwarranted intrusions of his or her freedom of
movement and right to privacy with the right of the public to be protected
from unreasonable danger. This equation and the balance change with the
facts presented.
Tucker, 878 P.2d at 858. As the Kansas Court of Appeals noted in State v.
Tucker, "A motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver is an instrument
of death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the public, and that threat
3

It may be argued that this court rejected this approach in Salt Lake City v. Bench. 2008
UT App 30 at f 25-26. This is not the case. Rather, this court maintained the importance
of such observations but found that given the facts before it, the balance weighed in favor
of Bench's constitutional rights. Id. at \ 26.
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must be eliminated as quickly as possible." Id. at 861. Ubder those
circumstances, "an investigatory... stop of a suspected Qrunken driver is a
[comparatively] minimal intrusion upon that driver's freedom of movement
and privacy.M Id. We agree with the Tucker court "that tlfie greater and
more immediate the risk to the public revealed by the tipJthe less
importance we will accord to the process of corroboration or verification of
the tip." Id. at 862. Thus, the following application of the law to the facts
of this case is colored by our belief that "the 'totality of circumstances tips
the balance in favor of public safety and lessens the . . . requirements of
reliability and corroboration." Id. at 864.
Id. (quoting State v. Tucker, 19 Kan. App. 2d 920, 927-31, 878 J\2d 855, 861-64 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1994). The Tucker court further explained that "the balancing test must consider
the risk to the public of not making an immediate stop against the right of an individual to
be free from such stops." Tucker, 19 Kan. App. 2d at 927. Five years later the Kansas
Supreme Court adopted the Tucker Court's analysis, finding th^t the "determination of
whether reasonable suspicion exist[s] under the totality of the circumstances is affected
by the threat a possible drunk driver poses to public safety." Stfyte v. Slater, 267 Kan.
694, 699, 986 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1999).
II.

OFFICER HYATT HAD A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO CONTACT DEFENDANT AND PERFORM THE
TRAFFIC STOP IRRESPECTIVE OF WHEtHER THIS COURT
RETAINS THE MULCAHY FRAMEWORK 0 R ADOPTS A
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS.

A. Analyzing the traffic stop under the three factors articulated in Mulcahv, the tip in
the case was sufficient to form Officer Hyatt's reasonable articulable suspicion to
stop the defendant's vehicle.
i.

Type of Tip or Informant.

Anonymous tips are toward "the low end of the reliability scale." Mulcahy at 235
(quoting Evans, 692 So. 2d at 218). But tips from a named citijzen informer are
13

considered reliable because they "volunteer information out of concern for the community
and not for personal benefit/' Id. (quoting Brown, 798 P.2d at 286). Officer Hyatt did not
ask the concerned citizen in the instant case for her name, but she faced the possibility
that he would ask her name or ask her to remain at the scene so he could obtain additional
information. She voluntarily approached the officer out of concern for the community
(i.e. the child in the car) and faced the real possibility that her identity would be made
known. That Officer Hyatt did not request more information from the woman does not
diminish the risk she took that her identity would be discovered.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that an officer may make a traffic
stop based upon an anonymous tip which was corroborated in some detail, even if the
entirety of the information was not sufficient to justify an arrest. Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 332, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). Further, The United States
Supreme Court has suggested that where "an informant places his anonymity at risk"
courts may "consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip." Florida v.
J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 276, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). "An instance where a tip might be considered anonymous but nevertheless
sufficiently reliable to justify a proportionate police response may be when an unnamed
person . . . stops for a moment and, face to face, informs the police that criminal activity
is occurring." Id. The face to face nature of the encounter imbues the tip with greater
reliability, because "a tip given face to face is more reliable than an anonymous telephone
call." United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000); see also United States
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v. Sanchez, 513 F.3d 1208, 1211-14 (10th Cir. 2008) (reasonably suspicion to stop found
where anonymous woman in her vehicle flagged down police officers and told them she
observed a man on woman assault at a nearby intersection; the wfoman provided no
further details and the officers immediately left for the intersection). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained this reasoningfyyreviewing several
cases from other jurisdictions that reached the same conclusion:
As the Fourth Circuit recently explained, when an informant relates
information to the police face to face, the officer has an Opportunity to
assess the informant's credibility and demeanor . United States v. Christmas,
222 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2000). And when an informant gives the police
information about a neighbor (as in Christmas) or someone nearby (as in
our case), the informant is exposed to a risk of retaliation from the person
named, making it less likely that the informant will lie. id. Similarly, as the
Fourth Circuit noted, "citizens who personally report crimes to the police
thereby make themselves accountable for lodging false complaints." Id.
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S. Ct. at|2329-30 (1983);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S. Ct. at 1923b.
Many cases have recognized the difference between in-pbrson informants
and anonymous telephone calls. See, e.g., Florida v. J.LL 529 U.S. at [276],
120 S. Ct. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If an informant places his
anonymity at risk, a court can consider this factor in weighing the reliability
of the tip. An instance where a tip might be considered anonymous but
nevertheless sufficiently reliable to justify a proportionate police response
may be when an unnamed person driving a car the police officer later
describes stops for a moment and, face to face, informs the police that
criminal activity is occurring."); Davis v. United States, 759 A.2d 665, 2000
WL 1358490 (D.C. 2000) (An officer had probable causb for a search after
an informant who declined to give his name flagged down the officer and
told him that a man nearby in a wheelchair was selling crack out of his right
shoe.); United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d p r . 1991) ("[A]
face-to-face informant must, as a general matter, be thought more reliable
than an anonymous telephone tipster, for the former runs the greater risk
that he may be held accountable if his information proves false."); United
States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Although
the informant did not identify himself by name, he woulji have been
15

available for further questioning if the agent had judged the procedure
appropriate. Unlike a person who makes an anonymous telephone call, this
informant confronted the agent directly.1'); United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d
159, 161 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ("Standards of reliability should not
prevent appropriate action when a victim of a crime immediately has
contacted the police. That same analysis applies [when a witness informs
the police in person about a crime].").
Id, at 354-55. This same recognition was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Sanchez. 513
F.3d 1208 at 1211-14.
A face to face informant whose identifying information the responding law
enforcement officer does not gather is not anonymous but "simply unidentified." State v,
Satter, 2009 SD 35,111 n.l, 766 N.W.2d 153 (S.D. 2009). In Salter, a "concerned
citizen" eyewitness reported to a police officer that he saw two men drinking beer in a
van. Id, at \ 1. The eyewitness was initially parked next to the van. Id, The officer was
parked at a fire station, and the eyewitness drove up next to the officer. Id, at f 2. As the
officer rolled down his window, the eyewitness said that he was recently parked at a gas
station across the street. Id. at \ 2-3. While there, a van parked next to the eyewitness'
vehicle. Id. at f 3. The eyewitness could see into the van and observed that its two
occupants were drinking beer, there were open containers in the van, and one occupant
went into the convenience store to purchase more beer. Id, It is unclear if the eyewitness
made any statements about whether he believed the van's occupants were under the
influence of alcohol. Id. at \ 3-4. From across the street the eyewitness pointed to the
van, which was still in the gas station parking lot. Id. at \ 4. Soon thereafter the van left
the parking lot. Id. At this time the officer went to follow the van without obtaining any
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of the eyewitness' identifying information. Id. After following Jthe van for two blocks
and seeing no erratic driving, the officer initiated a traffic stop. \Id. The driver was then
investigated and arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at Tf 5. The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence ar(d the defendant was
convicted at trial. Id. at Tf 5. In affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the eyewitness' tip alone was
"sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion." Id. at ^f 2\.
In so holding, the court found that the eyewitness was nc|t "truly" anonymous. Id.
at f 10. The eyewitness did not attempt to conceal his identity ^nd face to face tips are of
increased reliability. Id. at \ 12. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that an
anonymous tipster cannot be held accountable for "potentially ffabricated knowledge." Id.
at T| 11 n. 1. Such argument is inapplicable in the face to face context. Id. Additionally,
the exigency of the circumstances justified the officer in not regaining with the
eyewitness to gather his identifying information. Id. at % 16. Lfnder the totality of the
circumstances4, the tip was sufficiently reliable to form the sol^ basis of the officer's
reasonable suspicion. Id. at f P21.

4

Other considerations courts look to when determining the reliability of unidentified face
to face informants include: whether the informant voluntarily abproached law
enforcement (Schneider v. State, No. 738, 2009, 2010 Del. LE^CIS 413 at *7 (Del. Aug.
19, 2010)), whether the informant appeared to have an ulterior piotive, was unwilling to
provide his or her name, and whether the informant had an apparent motive to lie (State v.
Shurnway, 124 Ore. App. 131, 135, 861 P.2d 384 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)). The officer
approached by an unidentified face to face informant is in the unique position to evaluate
that person's credibility and information. State v. Cobb, 931 S W.2d 904, 907 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996).
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In People v. Willard, an unidentified motorist hailed an officer on a road to inform
the officer that "the car behind him was being driven by what he believed to be a drunk."
183 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 7, 228 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1986). The
anonymous citizen clearly identified the defendant's vehicle and the officer initiated a
traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle based entirely on the citizen's statements. Id. The
officer followed the indicated motorist and conducted a traffic stop. Id. The officer did
not observe erratic driving and testified that he made the stop solely on the basis of the
motorist's accusation. Id. In ruling there was reasonable suspicion for the stop, the court
found that the unidentified informant was "clothed with all the indicia of a reliable citizen
witness to crime and that the officer could reasonably rely on what the motorist told him,
and . .. that the officer did not get the motorist's name and address before detaining
defendant did not affect the motorist's reliability." Id. at 8.
In the present case, the citizen-witness believed the defendant was intoxicated, saw
him passed out in a car with a child, and approached Officer Hyatt about the situation.
Officer Hyatt described the citizen-witness' demeanor as one of concern that there was a
child in the car with someone who intoxicated and possibly unconscious. As in Willard,
there is no evidence the citizen-witness acted out of ulterior motives, and she risked her
anonymity by reporting her observations to a police officer. She did not attempt to
conceal her identity or remain anonymous, but instead approached the officer face-to-face
and provided details of the defendant's impairment. Further, the notion of an unnamed
but reliable citizen-informant is not an unknown principle in Utah law. In State v. Miller,
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the defendant argued that the unidentified informant neighbors lacked veracity and
reliability. State v. Miller, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, H 8, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987). This Court recognized that "the average neighbor witness is not the type of
informant in need of independent proof of reliability or veracity." Id. "[V]eracity is
generally assumed when the information comes from an average citizen who is in a
position to supply information by virtue of having been a crime victim or witness." Id.
(citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
The citizen-witness here was not anonymous but merely unidentified. Face to face
informants whose identity remains unknown occupy a special status in other jurisdictions'
reasonable suspicion jurisprudence which Appellee asks this Court to formally adopt
(having previously made a passing recognition thereof in Miller). The citizen-witness
here approached the officer in the park on foot, and had her children with her. Officer
Hyatt explained her demeanor as one of concern, especially concern for the child who
was in the custody of an intoxicated adult. She had all the trappings of an average
citizen-witness, and Officer Hyatt was in the unique position to assess both her credibility
and information. He could determine whether she had an ulterior motive and was
justified in his quick response given the exigencies of the situation. Further, this
immediate action in no way vitiates the citizen-witness' reliability. She placed her
anonymity at risk and could have been located in the park and subject to prosecution had
the information proved false.
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ii.

Detail Provided Regarding Criminal Activity.

The second factor is whether the information provided sufficient detail about the
criminal activity to support a stop. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. In Mulcahy, the informant
provided the information to the officers as the events unfolded and the informant
accurately described the events. Id. The informant provided a description of the car,
direction of the car's movement, and a timeline for the events. Id. This Court found
these details sufficient to support the stop. Id. at 238. In Willard, an unidentified
informant contacted an officer on the street and pointed out a drunk driver. Willard, 183
Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 7. The Willard court concluded that was sufficient information to
justify the stop. Id. at 8.
Here, the citizen-witness pointed out the defendant to Officer Hyatt and said she
believed the person in the car (the defendant) was intoxicated and was now passed out
with a child in the car.5 Although the citizen-witness did not explain her basis for calling
the defendant drunk, this should not weigh against her reliability. This Court has
repeatedly recognized that "members of the general public have common knowledge
about whether a person is under the influence of alcohol." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237;
accord Bench, 2008 UT App 30 at 120 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), State v. Van Dyke, 2009
UT App 369, Tf 24, 223 P.3d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 2009). Also, the Willard the court
concluded that u[t]he objective signs of intoxication are matters of common knowledge

5

The trial court here found the woman's report that the man was "passed out" to be
"significant as it conveys meaningful detail about Street's level of intoxication."
Memorandum Decision, at 4 n.4.
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and experience. Implicit in the motorist's statement is that he h^d observed defendant
and believed him to be drunk. We find no other common sense Explanation for his
statement." Willard, 183 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 9.
The citizen-witness' statement that she believed the man }n the car was intoxicated
proves doubly insightful. While Officer Hyatt immediately toolq action upon hearing the
tip and did not remain at the scene to plumb the citizen-witness' jknowledge, this
statement of belief implies a level of personal observation by th^ informant. The citizenwitness told Officer Hyatt what she observed: there was an intoxicated man passed out in
a car, and that there was a child with this man. Officer Hyatt assessed the citizen-witness'
demeanor as concerned, and was in the position to determine whether there was any hint
of fabrication in her report. When Officer Hyatt arrived at the location identified by the
citizen-witness, he was able to identify the man, the vehicle, an4 that there was a child in
the car (all details provided to him by the citizen-witness). Although the citizen-witness
remained unidentified, the details she gave Officer Hyatt were sufficient to support a
reasonable articulable suspicion for the traffic stop.6

6

The citizen-witness did not tell Officer Hyatt that the vehicle Was currently in motion.
This does not alter the analysis, however, as the exigency remains given that the
intoxicated male had a child in his custody and could conceivably have operated the
vehicle at any moment (which proved to be precisely the case). Officer Hyatt, then,
approached the vehicle's location with the expectation that he was about to initiate a
level-one encounter. That the described vehicle was in motion ivhen he arrived did not
undercut the citizen-witness' tip but instead heightened the situation's exigency.
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iii.

Police Officer's Observations and Corroboration.

The final Mulcahy factor is whether the officer's observations corroborate the
details of the informant's tip. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. In Mulcahy, the officer
observed the described car at the indicated location. Id. at 238. The officer did not,
however, observe erratic driving or have any indication the defendant was drunk. Id.
Nonetheless, this Court found that this satisfactorily corroborated the informant's report.
Id. Willard is similar in that the officer did not observe the defendant driving erratically,
but pulled him over based entirely on the informant's statements. Willard, 183 Cal. App.
3d Supp. at 7. There the court concluded that this established a reasonable articulable
suspicion. Id.
In the instant case, Officer Hyatt's observations corroborated the information
provided by the concerned citizen. Officer Hyatt went to the location specified by the
citizen-witness, and there he found the vehicle matching the description he had been
provided. Additionally, inside the vehicle was a male driver who matched the physical
description furnished by the citizen-witness, and a child was in the vehicle as well. That
Officer Hyatt was able to locate the person and vehicle in the specific location all as
described by the citizen-witness bolsters the citizen-witness' credibility. The citizenwitness told Officer Hyatt that the defendant was passed out in the car. When Officer
Hyatt went to investigate the situation, he observed the defendant driving the vehicle.
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Officer Hyatt then made a stop based on the citizen-witness' information.7 The entire
situation changed the instant Officer Hyatt saw the vehicle was ill motion and not parked,
and that the defendant was not passed out but driving the car. Also, Officer Hyatt
immediately recognized that there was a child passenger in the cftr. Officer Hyatt
expected to encounter a parked car containing an unconscious arid intoxicated man as
well as a child. Instead he saw the described vehicle in motion, the described intoxicated
man driving, and a child in the car. The situation justified and required immediate
action.8
The tip in Mulcahy involved a drunk driver who was operating a vehicle out on the
roadway. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 233. The court found this pointl critical, considering "the
ever-changing equation used to balance the rights of an individual to be free from
unwarranted intrusions of his or her freedom of movement and ijight to privacy with the
right of the public to be protected from unreasonable danger." i|i. at 236. The Court paid
special attention to the Kansas Court of Appeals' language in State v. Tucker.
[a] motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver is an instrument of death.
It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the public, and that threat must be
eliminated as quickly as possible." Id. at 861. Under thos0 circumstances,

n

There are additional details observed by Officer Hyatt that, although discovered after the
stop, further corroborate the citizen-witness' information and bolster her reliability.
Officer Hyatt testified that he smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant, that
the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, and that the defendant act^d in a manner consistent
with intoxicated persons.
o

An officer is not required to rule out all possible innocent behavior before initiating a
traffic stop. United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th C^r. 1975). u[P]olice
officers must be permitted to act before their reasonable belief i^ verified by escape or
fruition of the harm it was their duty to prevent." Id.
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"an investigatory . .. stop of a suspected drunken driver is a [comparatively]
minimal intrusion upon that driver's freedom of movement and privacy.
Id. at 236 (quoting Tucker, 19 Kan. App. 2d at 927-31). The Tucker court also
recognized that "[t]he risk of danger presented to the public by a drunken driver is so
great that we cannot afford to impose strict, verifiable conditions on an anonymous tip
before an investigatory stop can be made in response to such a tip." Id. at 931.
Here, if the information provided to Officer Hyatt was that the intoxicated man
was passed out, then Officer Hyatt arguably had adequate time to further investigate the
tip and obtain the citizen-witness' identifying information (even so, there was nothing
improper about his mere appearance at the scene described by the citizen-witness).9 But
when Officer Hyatt arrived at the described location, only to find the described vehicle
being driven by the described intoxicated male (with described child in tow), the "everchanging equation" was triggered, and the defendant's vehicle could be justifiably
stopped. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. Officer Hyatt could properly rely on the information
furnished to him by the citizen-witness and stop the moving vehicle.
B. The totality of the circumstances approach favored by the Utah Supreme Court is
less exacting, accordingly if reasonable suspicion for the stop exists under the
Mulcahy analysis then so too does it under a totality of the circumstances
approach.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that a totality of the circumstances test is more
flexible thanM//ca/*y's exacting analysis. Saddler, 2004 UT 105 at ]} 10. Therefore if

9

If Defendant was still passed out and the car was parked, any contact by Officer Hyatt
would have amounted to just a level-one encounter, as mentioned in note 6, supra.
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reasonable suspicion exists in this case under the Mulcahy test, sjo too will it exist under
the totality of the circumstances analysis favored by our Suprem^ Court.
This case involves an unidentified but highly reliable citizen-witness: a woman
who approached Officer Hyatt on foot with her children. She spoke with Officer Hyatt
face to face, thereby placing herself in a position to be identified Officer Hyatt had the
opportunity to assess her credibility and demeanor, as well as whether she appeared to
have an ulterior motive or was fabricating information. She believed the man in the
vehicle (the defendant) was intoxicated and said he was currently passed out. Officer
Hyatt determined that she was specifically concerned about the Child in the vehicle, as she
did not want someone who she believed to be intoxicated to drive with a child in the car.
She provided sufficiently specific detail such that Officer Hyatt (successfully located the
described car, persons, and location. And because she is a highly reliable informant, less
police officer corroboration is required. Bench, 2008 UT App JO at f 21. Under the
totality of the circumstances the citizen-witness was reliable, Officer Hyatt had
information that the driver of the moving vehicle before him w^s significantly
intoxicated, and reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop^ of Defendant's vehicle.
III.

EVEN IF THIS COURT DOES NOT FIND OFFICER HYATT HAD
A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE, THE STOP CAN NONETHELESS BE
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER
DOCTRINE.

In Provo City v. Warden, an officer was given information about an individual
looking for cocaine who was going to "drive himself into a w a i f 202 Utah Adv. Rep.
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25, If 1, 844 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The officer located the suspected
individual driving a vehicle and pulled him over. Id. The defendant was determined to
be driving under the influence and was arrested. Id. The officer testified in trial that the
stop was based "on a welfare check for this individual's wellbeing." Id. The trial court
held that the officer could make a "welfare stop" based on unverified information and that
any arrest made on the basis of evidence discovered at the time was legal. Id. at 362.
This Court affirmed. Id. at 366.
This was an issue of first impression in Utah and it was necessary to look to other
jurisdictions for guidance. Id. at 363. In Cady v Dombrowski, the United States Supreme
Court explained that officers will have much more contact with citizens in their vehicles
than in their homes and that much of that contact will not have anything to do with traffic
violations. 413 US 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). The Court defines
community caretaking functions as "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Id. In a case from
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the court granted a motion
to suppress evidence that was discovered when an officer stopped someone because the
officer thought the defendant was lost. United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704,
(Conn. D. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1979). The court balanced the privacy of
the individual with public interest. Id. at 706. The court held that in cases where the
officer thought the defendant was lost and there was no substantial safety interest, the
balance was in favor of the defendant. Id. at 707-08.
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The Warden court considered these two cases amongst others, observing that no
jurisdiction had "explicitly rejected the notion that community caretaker concerns can
justify stops and seizures under appropriate circumstance," and tjhat each jurisdiction has
its own system of determining whether a stop is legitimate. Warden, 844 P.2d at 363.
The court fashioned a three tiered test for determining if a stop ib reasonable under the
community caretaker doctrine. Id. at 364. The three tiers are:
[fjirst, did a seizure occur under the Fourth Amendment definition of that
term? Second, based upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in pursuit
of a bona fide community caretaker function ~ under the given
circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a
purpose consistent with community caretaker functions? Third, based upon
an objective analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate ^n imminent
danger to life or limb?
Id.
A. Seizure.
The first tier is whether a seizure occurred under the Foukh Amendment definition
of the term. Id. There was a seizure in this case. But see notes |1, 6, and 9, supra.
Officer Hyatt flagged down Defendant's car, spoke with Defendant, and called for
another officer to conduct the DUI investigation.
B. Bona Fide Community Caretaker Function.
The second tier is whether, based upon an objective analysis, the seizure was in
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function. Warden, $44 P.2d at 363. This is
further described as whether, under the given circumstances, a Reasonable officer would
have stopped the vehicle for a purpose consistent with the comitiunitv caretaker functions.
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Id. In Cady, community caretaker functions are defined as "totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute." Cady, 413 US 433 at 441. Here, Officer Hyatt was informed that there was an
intoxicated man passed out in a car with a child. Although Officer Hyatt had information
that there may be criminal activity, there was also a caretaker element to his investigation
to ensure the child was safe. A reasonable officer would have investigated the situation
upon hearing information from the citizen-witness who approached that officer and was
concerned for a child passenger in the vehicle of an intoxicated adult. And with this
information in mind, a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle if that officer
discovered it to be in motion.
C. Imminent Danger to Life or Limb.
The third tier is whether, under an objective analysis, the circumstances
demonstrated an imminent danger to life or limb. Warden, 844 P.2d at 364. Officer
Hyatt was told the defendant appeared intoxicated, was passed out in a vehicle, and that
there was a child with defendant. These facts alone do not present imminent danger to
life or limb. However, such a danger arises to the public and the defendant the moment
the defendant regains consciousness and begins operating the vehicle. This danger is
magnified by virtue of the fact that a child is in the car with the defendant.
The Warden Court specifically "required circumstances threatening life or safety,
rather than using exigent situations as merely a factor in a mix of considerations." Id. As
recognized by this Court in Mulcahy, "[a] motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver
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is an instrument of death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety of tl^e public, and that threat
must be eliminated as quickly as possible." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d ^t 236 (quoting Tucker,
19 Kan. App. 2d at 927). As previously discussed, there is no reason to disbelieve the
citizen-witness in this case. Given the infonnation available to Officer Hyatt, the change
in events as he discovers the defendant is conscious and operating the vehicle, and the
fact that there is a child passenger in the vehicle, the welfare stob was justified.
Objectively analyzed, the action was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court has intimated that Mulcahy's tripartite test should be
abandoned in favor of the more flexible totality of the circumstances analysis. Just the
same, reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop under either framework. The
concerned citizen-witness in this case, though unidentified, was ireliable. Adequate detail
was provided and Officer Hyatt was able to corroborate the information. Moreover, even
if no reasonable articulable suspicion is found, Officer Hyatt w^s justified in contacting
Defendant under the community caretaker doctrine. It is for the foregoing reasons that
Appellee respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's decision denying
Defendant's motion to suppress.
Dated this 1 7

day of September, 2010,

X V y a n P. C. Stack (11298)
/ ./Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Appellee Salt L^ke City
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